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IN SEARCH OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY:
ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
IN MISSISSIPPI
David W Case*
Who's to doom, when thejudge himself
is dragged to'the bar?1
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview

The question posed by Melville's Ahab captures the emotionally charged debate at the heart of controversy over judicial selection methods: Who will judge
the judges? In Mississippi, state judges are "judged" by the electorate through a
system of partisan elections. This article challenges whether popular election of
judges is best suited to the goal of selecting the most qualified, independent, and

* B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. The author is an LL.M. candidate at the Columbia University School of
Law.
1. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK, ch. 132 (1851).
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responsible judiciary. Along the way, an overview of Mississippi's history with judicial selection will be offered, together with a critical analysis of its current system and a discussion of alternatives.
B. The Tension Between Accountability and Independence
The sometimes virulent exchange of views over judicial selection methods is a
continuation of a larger jurisprudential debate with roots in this country as far
back as Hamilton and Jefferson. 2 That debate concerns the inevitable tension between principles of democratic accountability and judicial independence. These
opposing views have led to the development of "an almost endless combination of
schemes used to select judges," 3 with each state reaching varying conclusions concerning the proper balance between accountability and independence. 4
The primary argument of those favoring popular election of judges is that the
judiciary, as with other public officials, should be accountable to the people.'
They believe that democratic ideals are best served by ajudge's initial mandate being bestowed by the electorate, which may then reaffirm or withhold its approval
through periodic elections. 6 The judge thus remains accountable to the voters, insuring an acceptable response "to new and compelling needs of a dynamic society."'7 Most importantly, accountability allows majoritarian control of public

2. PhilIip L. Dubois,Accountability, Independence, and the Selection ofState Judges: The Role ofPopularJudicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue) 31, 37 (1986) [hereinafter Dubois, Accountability]. Alexander Hamilton was a vocal defender of the judiciary's need for complete independence "to enforce a constitution which limits
the powers of the legislature and the executive, and to protect minorities from any occasional oppression by the
government or a majority of the populace." John L. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics:An Argumentfor
Merit Election, 40 BAYLOR L. Rv. 339, 345 n.21 (1988) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398 (Alexander
Hamilton) (G. Wills ed., 1982)). On the other side of this historical debate, Thomas Jefferson argued that ajudiciary free from public control was at odds with the republican form of government established by the framers of
the United States Constitution. See John J. Korzen, Comment, ChangingNorth Carolina'sMethod ofJudicial Selection, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 253, 253 (1990).

3. Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 40.
4. Id.; see also William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years ofJudicialRetention Election Have Told
Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 352 (1987). It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the connection between
judicial selection and tenure and the tension between independence and accountability, and the resulting effect on
American jurisprudential history. For example, Robert Cover, in his study of the American judicial role in institutional slavery, discusses the historical relationship between the antebellum judge's concept of his role in reviewing the slavery question and the "tension between independence and accountability of the undemocratic branch of
representative government." ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 131
(1975).
The problem of selection and tenure ofjudges put the issue directly. Should the judge be accountable to the
people directly through popular elections; indirectly through election by state legislatures? Should the
role be completely insulated through a tenure of"good behavior," or should there be a term of years? But
the selection and tenure issue could not have arisen without recognition of the lawmaking input of the
judiciary. There was impetus to subject the judiciary to democratic processes because the creative side of
the judge had come to be appreciated more than ever before. That appreciation included the common law
function (evolution of doctrine through case-by-case adjudication) and the interpretative function -the
creation of doctrine through application of an instrument to particular facts.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Otto B. Mullinax, JudicialRevision-An Argument Against the Merit Planfor Judicial Selection
and Tenure, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 21,25 (1973).
6. See id.
7. Id.
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policy through electoral control of judicial policymakers. 8 Popular election is also
claimed to "benefit" the judiciary by allowing it to function on a "co-equal" footing
with the executive and legislative branches.'
Critics of judicial elections, however, note that the price of political accountability may be the loss of judicial independence.10 The judiciary serves a critical
anti-majoritarian role requiring protection from popular influence."' This principle not only requires freedom from personal or private influence, but immunity
from the influence or control of legislatures or executives. 2 Notwithstanding the
policymaking function inherent in the judicial role, therefore, the courts should
also be independent of temporary public majorities and shifting popular opinion. 3
Judges are neither legislators nor executives, but, instead, occupy a distinctly different role requiring that they apply the law and legal principles in a neutral fashion
without regard to political consequences.
Universal agreement is unlikely to ever be achieved in the debate over whether
principles of democratic government can be reconciled with the concept of a judiciary insulated from public control. This article is not an attempt to marshal consensus, assuming that to be a reachable goal, as there already exists voluminous
legal commentary devoted to attempts to chart a course between these principles.
Whether there is any benefit to be realized by a change in Mississippi's method of
judicial selection, however, must be considered in the light of these competing
viewpoints. Moreover, this article is not purported to be written from a completely
indifferent perspective, as it reflects the author's view that increased protection of
judicial independence is not only desirable, but necessary. It is hoped that this
work will serve as the origination for debate in Mississippi's institutions of government, and that it will contribute to the ongoing discussion of this topic in the
state's legal community.
II.

MISSISSIPPI JUDICIAL SELECTION:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Of ConstitutionalConventions andJacksonianDemocracy
Following the organization of the Mississippi Territory in 1798, territorial
judges were appointed by the president of the United States. 14 In March 1817,
Congress passed legislation authorizing the territory's western half to enter the un-

8. See Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 36-37.
9. Mullinax, supra note 5, at 25.
10. See Robert E Utter, State ConstitutionalLaw, the United States Supreme Court, and DemocraticAccountability: Is There a Crocodilein the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19, 43 (1989).
11. See Korzen, supra note 2, at 260; Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 36.
12. PHILIP L. DuBois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
24 (1980) [hereinafter DuBols, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH].
13. Id.
14. Frank E. Everett, Jr., Lawyers, Courts, andJudges 1890-1970, in 2 A HISTORY OF MISSiSSIppI 375, 375-76
(Richard A. McLemore ed., 1973).
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ion as its twentieth state.15 That July, forty-seven delegates convened in the territorial capital of Washington to draft Mississippi's first constitution.1" The new
constitution provided for state judges to hold office "during good behavior," but in
no case past the age of sixty-five years.17 Although the delegates did not expressly
define the manner of selection, the new state's judges were eventually elected by
the general assembly, rather than the voters. 18
In October 1817, Governor David Holmes addressed Mississippi's first general
assembly." Regarding judicial selection, he instructed the legislature that:
By the Constitution the Judiciary is placed upon a footing as independent as that
of any other State in the union. I therefore feel confident, that you will consider it
important, that the appointments should be filled with men learned in the laws, of
undoubted integrity, and of an independence of character which cannot be shaken by
circumstances unconnected with a faithful and righteous discharge of their duties. In
all free governments, the acts of the Judiciary are of more immediate consequence to
the safety and tranquillity of society than that of any other department. They pronounce what the law is, not only between contending individuals, but between the
public and those who may be charged with public offenses, so that the security of
life, liberty and property may be considered as united with the purity and intelligence of those who fill the seats of Justice.20
As these comments demonstrate, Mississippi's initial selection system reflected a
desire for independence, rather than political accountability.
Andrew Jackson's rise to political prominence in the 1820s signaled the beginnings of a populist reform movement intended to democratize all aspects of government, including the judiciary. 21 The tenets of Jacksonian democracy were
perhaps embraced most fervently in Mississippi, where Jackson was revered with
"an almost blind political worship. "22 Jackson's Mississippi followers attacked the
1817 constitution as undemocratic, and considered its provisions providing for
legislative or executive appointment of most public officials as inconsistent with
the concept of public accountability. 23 In 1831, Mississippians overwhelmingly

15. JOHN R. SKATES, JR., A HISTORY OF THE MISSISSIPPi SUPREME COURT, 1817-1948, 1-2 (1973)[hereinafter
SKATES, HISTORY].
16. Id. at 2; EDWIN A. MILES, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN MississiPPi 33 (1960).
17. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 2.

18. Id. at 4; MILES, supra note 16, at 33.
19. David Holmes, 1817 Address to the Mississippi General Assembly, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES

OF THE

GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 1817-1890 1, 3 (Robert E. McArthur & Dorothy 1. Wilson eds., 1981).

20. Id. at 3.
21. See DuBOiS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 12, at 3; Madison B. McClellan, Note, Merit Appoint-

ment Versus PopularElection:A Reformer's Guide to JudicialSelection Methods in Florida,43 FLA. L. REV. 529,
534(1991).
22. Porter L. Fortune, Jr., The FormativePeriod,in 1A HISTORY OF Mississippi 251,251 (Richard A. McLemore ed., 1973). As an example of Mississippians' unrestrained admiration, when Mississippi's new capital was
established at Le Fleur's Bluff on the Pearl River, it was named in honor of Jackson. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note
15, at 11.

23. See SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 11; Everett, supr note 14, at 378-79.
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voted to hold a new constitutional convention, and the election of delegates was set
for August 1832.24
. Conflicting and impassioned positions regarding judicial selection quickly became the cornerstone of the delegates' campaigns . 2' A conservative faction, disparagingly referred to as "aristocrats," favored the continued selection ofjudges by
legislative election, although they were willing to substitute appointment by the
governor with senate confirmation .26 The "aristocrats" feared that an elected judiciary would be subject to partisan influences and corruption. 27 The Jacksonians,
known as "whole-hogs," insisted that all public officials, including judges, should
be elected by the people. 28 A third faction of little influence, labeled "half-hogs,"
offered a compromise calling for election of lower court judges, but appointment
of supreme court judges.2 9 In a clear portent of what was to come, the "whole hogs"
won a majority of the delegate seats. 3"
At the 1832 convention, although most of the democratic ideals incorporated
into the new constitution kindled little opposition, the subject of an elective judiciary was, as expected, highly controversial. 31 Following several clashes in the judiciary committee and on the convention floor, Jacksonian democracy triumphed,
and the new constitution provided that all judges, as well as virtually all other public officials, would be chosen by popular election.32 Mississippi had become the

24. SKATES, HIsToRY, supra note 15, at 11-12.
25. Fortune, supra note 22, at 280.
26. SKATES, HisToRy, supra note 15, at 12.
27. Id. The leader of the "aristocrats," Chancellor John A. Quitman, later to become governor of Mississippi,
expressed belief that judicial elections "would be dangerous to the extreme, would tend to corruption, and strike a
fatal blow at the independence of the judiciary." MiLEs, supra note 16, at 36.
28. SKATES, HisTORy, supra note 15, at 12. As one Jacksonian delegate, Steven Duncan, zealously expressed,
"You may. . . rest assured that we will give you a constitution. . . much more democraticthan any other in the
U.S. Not republican-butdownright and absolute democracy." JOHN R. SKATES, Mississippi 86 (1979) [hereinafter
SKATES, Mississippi]; see also MILES, supra note 16, at 33.
29. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 12.
30. Id.
31. See SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 13; Fortune, supra note 22, at 282.
32. See SKATES, IsTORY, supra note 15, at 13; MALEs, supra note 16, at 42.
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first state in the nation to establish a completely elective judiciary,33 despite predictions of dire consequences by its opponents.34
Following the Civil War, Congress, in 1867, declared the ex-Confederate states
to be without legal governments, requiring Mississippi to draft a new constitution."5 The Reconstruction constitution of 1868 eliminated the elective judiciary,
and, instead, substituted gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent
of the state senate .3' By 1890, the demand to replace the Reconstruction constitu37
tion had become unyielding, and a new constitutional convention was called. Although the merits of an elective versus appointive judiciary were again vigorously
debated, the 1890 constitution made no change in the method of judicial selection. 8

33. Duaois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 3; Everett, supra note 14, at 378. Mississippi had
apparently also become the first state to choose popular election as a method of selecting supreme court judges.
SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 14. Georgia had, in 1812, provided for election of lower court judges. McClellan, supra note 21, at 535 n.43. By virtue of its 1832 constitution, Mississippi became known as the South's
most democratic state. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 13-14. Mississippi's example was not followed until 14
years later when, in 1845, New York established an elective judiciary. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra
note 12, at 3.
34. See MILES, supra note 16, at 42. In fact, ten "aristocrats" voted against final adoption of the constitution
because it contained provisions for elected judges. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 14. One of their members,
Judge George Winchester, published an address intended to influence the 1833 legislature to return the state to
appointive judgeships, predicting:
It will not be long before the industrious portion of our community, will become so harassed by the
frequent occurrence of elections, that they will leave the election of our judges to the idle and designing.
What an admirable character shall we then present.
Citizens of free States will not emigrate with their families and property; or bring their property and
persons for purposes of commerce, within the limits of a State where there is no security in the independence of the Judges for the correct and impartial administration ofjustice. Where the will of a few voters
at the polls, dictates the rule of decision to the Judge.
Id. (quoting George Winchester, An Address to the People of Mississippi 12 (Mississippi Department of Archives
and History, 1933)).
35. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 32.
36. Id. at 33-34. James L. Alcorn, the first governor elected under the 1868 constitution, commented on the
change in Mississippi's method ofjudicial selection in his inaugural address, stating:
The Constitution of the State has taken the selection of our Judges out of the hands of the people. In this,
it intended, evidently, to withdraw the choice of those highly important functionaries from thepassion of
politics. It clearly sought, by the change, to bring to the selection of our Judiciary, all the elevating influences of deliberate judgment, and individual responsibility. And under this view ofthe objects of the Constitution, I feel it my solemn duty to hold of less binding force than ordinarily, any restraints that may so
narrow my choice for the Supreme Bench, as to confine me to men falling below a very high standard of
fitness, morally and intellectually.
James L. Alcorn, 1870 Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 18171890 103, 109-10 (Robert E. McArthur & Dorothy I. Wilson eds., 1981).
37. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 41-42.
38. See id. at 43.
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The issue remained unsettled, however, and was the subject of much discussion
during the next three decades. 39 In 1910, the legislature submitted to the voters a
proposed constitutional amendment making circuit and chancery court judgeships
elective. 4" The amendment was approved and formally inserted into the constitution in 1912.41 Another proposed amendment requiring the election of supreme
court justices was approved by Mississippi voters in November 1914, and became
part of the constitution in 1916.42 Mississippi's principal judicial offices have remained elective positions ever since.
B. Mississippi's CurrentFramework
Mississippi's highest court is comprised of nine supreme court justices elected
for staggered eight year terms.' The state is divided into three supreme court districts from which three justices each are elected on an at-large basis." To be qualified for the office, a candidate must be at least thirty-years old and have both
practiced law and resided in Mississippi for five years.45 The supreme court is a

39. See Everett, supra note 14, at 379. An interesting view of this debate can be seen from the oratory of Mississippi governors during the period. For example, Governor James K. Vardaman's 1904 inaugural address extolled the virtues of an appointed judiciary.
The judge. . . should be a man of unquestionied probity, of high moral character, he should be learned in
the law, he should be honest and independent. . . . The Governor who appoints him is but [the people's]
instrument, performing a sacred trust. I want to impress upon you, my countrymen, that the Governor
who would use the appointive power as his personal property, as a mere political asset, for self aggrandizement, falls disappointingly below the ideal, and defeats the lofty purpose of the founders of our government. And the man who would accept the office at the hands of a Governor, who would thus prostitute
this sacred function, and then recognize any sort of personal obligation to him in the discharge of his official duty, or the use of the prestige of his high station, is not fit for the place, but on the other hand, degrades the ermine. I want Mississippi to keep up and maintain the grand old standard of excellence, I want
the Judiciary exempt from the pernicious influence of political bossism, I want the judge who holds a
commission from the Governor to understand that the only obligation or debt he owes that Governor is to
perform fairly, fearlessly, intelligently and justly the functions of the office of judge. Let the political
judge, that judicial cancer on the body politic, a disease of recent development in Mississippi, let it be
extirpated, and as quickly as that sovereign remedy, the honest intelligent ballot, can heal the festering
sore, let it become a thing only of odious memory. The cheap, low, sordid, dangerous conception that a
judgeship is the private property or political asset of the Governor with which he may purchase and control the services of a few cheap politicians, debauch the bench and the ballot, the very sheet anchor of our
political salvation, should be made infamous in the minds of the people.
James K. Vardaman, 1904 Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE GovERNORs OF MISSISSIPPI 18901980 20, 24-25 (University of Mississippi Bureau of Governmental Research ed., 1980).
Supporters ofjudicial elections, however, were given an opportunity for rebuttal only four years later, when
Governor Edmond F. Noel argued:
Election of Judges and Levee Commissioners requires neither more nor different virtue and sense
from that involved in choosing district attorneys and other officers. If our carefully culled, high grade
electors are unfit to name Judges, their unfitness is equally applicable to other officers and would prove
them unworthy of self-government. The people wish to settle this question for themselves and should be
trusted with its settlement.
Edmond F. Noel, 1908 Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADoRESSES OF THE GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 18901980 34, 35 (University of Mississippi Bureau of Governmental Research ed., 1980).
40. SKATES, HISTORy, supra note 15, at 114 n.43; State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 64 So. 241,241 (Miss. 1914).
41. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 114 n.43; Jones, 64 So. at 241.
42. SKATES, HISTORY, supra note 15, at 51.
43. Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145B, 149; Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-991 (1990).
44. Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145, 145B.
45. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 150.
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court of general appellate jurisdiction and hears both civil and criminal appeals
from Mississippi's twenty circuit court and twenty chancery court districts.'
Mississippi's circuit and chancery courts are its primary trial courts.47 Judges
on both courts are elected for four year terms.' As with supreme court justices,
elections for circuit and chancery judges are held concurrently with the election of
representatives to Congress." Circuit judges and chancellors must be at least
twenty-six years old, and also have practiced law and resided in Mississippi for
five years.5 0 Candidates for the supreme court, circuit court, and chancery court

46. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-9 (1990).
47. Mississippi counties with a population exceeding 50,000 also have county courts, whose judges must possess the same qualifications as do circuit judges. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1(1)(b), 9-9-5 (1991). The Mississippi Constitution further establishes the office of justice court judge (formerly justice of the peace) for each
county, with the requirement that such judges be at least a high school graduate or possess a general equivalency
diploma and have previously resided for two years within the district to which she is elected. See Miss. CONsT.
art. 6, § 171. Each municipality in Mississippi has a municipal court, except that municipalities with a population of less than 10,000 may opt to allow the mayor to serve as municipal judge. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 21-231,21-23-5 (1990).
In 1990, the Mississippi legislature created the position of supreme court magistrate. Three magistrates, one
from each supreme court district, are appointed by, and serve at the will and pleasure of, the supreme court.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-47(l) (1991). The magistrates must possess the same qualifications as do circuit and
chancery judges. Id. Loosely defined by statute, their duties are to aid and assist the supreme court in the performance of its duties. Id. § 9-3-47(2). The statute authorizing the positions is currently scheduled to expire on
December 31, 1995. Id.
48. Miss. CNST. art. 6, § 153.
49. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-991, 23-15-1013 (1990).
50. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 154.
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are nominated and elected by political party affiliation. 5 ' Vacancies in these offices, however, are filled, on an interim basis, by gubernatorial appointment.5 2
III.

MISSISSIPPI'S JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD:
PARTISAN ELECTION

A. A CriticalAnalysis
Riding the tide of the Jacksonian reform movement, by the time of the Civil
War, twenty-four of the thirty-four states elected judges.5" The national trend to
select judges by popular election continued to the middle of this century. ' In the
last half century, however, partisan election has been abandoned by the majority of

51. Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-997 (1990) provides, in part:
Nominations of candidates for the office of judge of the Supreme Court by any political party shall be
made by districts ....
The general primary election laws shall apply to and govern the nomination of
candidates for the office of judge of the Supreme Court insofar as they may be applicable.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1013 (1990) states:
Nominations of candidates for the office of circuit court judge and for the office of chancery court
Primary elecjudge shall be made in every county in their respective districts by primary election ....
tions ...

shall be held under the general primary election laws of the state.

See also Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-995, 23-15-1015 (1990) (laws regulating general elections in Mississippi
apply to and govern elections for supreme court, and circuit and chancery courts).
County court and justice court judgeships are also elective positions. See Miss. CooE ANN. §§ 9-9-5(1), 911-2(2) (1991). Municipal court judges, however, are appointed by the governing authorities of the municipality.
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-23-3 (1990).
52. Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-103 (1991) states:
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any judicial office by reason of death of an incumbent, resignation
or retirement of an incumbent, removal of an incumbent from office, or creation of a new judicial office
in which there has not heretofore been an incumbent, the Governor shall have the authority to appoint a
qualified person to fill such vacancy to serve for the unexpired term or until such vacancy is filled by election as provided in Section 23-15-849, Mississippi Code of 1972. When a vacancy shall occur for any of
the reasons enumerated in this section, the clerk of the court shall notify the Governor of such vacancy
immediately.
If the unexpired term exceeds nine months, Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-849 (1990), requires the governor to
make an interim appointment and calls for a special election to be held at the next regular election for state officers or for congressional representatives.
The Mississippi constitution also provides for gubernatorial appointment to fill vacancies in judicial offices,
but requires senate concurrence for such appointments.
The governor shall have power to fill any vacancy which may happen during the recess of the senate
in the office of judge or chancellor, by making a temporary appointment of an incumbent, which shall
expire at the end of the next session of the senate, unless a successor shall be sooner appointed and confirmed by the senate. When a temporary appointment of a judge or chancellor has been made during recess of the senate, the governor shall have no power to remove the person or appointee, nor power to
withhold his name from the senate for their action.
MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 177.
Following the 1912 amendment of article 6, section 153 of the constitution (mandating the election, rather
than appointment, of circuit judges and chancellors), however, the governor's power to make appointments pursuant to Section 177 was challenged in State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 64 So. 241 (Miss. 1914). The court held that
the amendment of Section 153 removing the governor's power to appoint circuit judges and chancellors also deprived him of the ability to make appointments under Section 177. Id. at 256-57. Because of Jones, the governor's
authority to make interim judicial appointments appears to come strictly from Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-103
(1991). Accordingly, it appears that Section 177's requirement of senatorial approval for such appointments is
also inert.
53. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 9

(1974).
54. See Hill, supra note 2, at 346; Korzen, supra note 3, at 258.
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states as the primary means of judicial selection. 5 Although Mississippi is not
alone in selecting all of its appellate and general jurisdiction trial court judges
through partisan election, the list of states that continue to do so is slight.56 Only
Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginiajoin Mississippi in making commensurable wholesale use of the partisan bal57

lot.

A weakness of partisan election as ajudicial selection method is the perception
that it opens the judiciary to the unfavorable influence and control of party politics. 5 8 Support in judicial election campaigns, for example, may be used as a reward to individuals who have engaged in high levels of party activity."s Re-election
campaigns may require continued fidelity to party politics even after a candidate
takes judicial office.6" In states where political parties play an active role in choosing judicial candidates, the voters merely decide between the selections of party
officials.61 In such a case, political parties, and not the electorate, play the critical
role in judicial selection. 62 Moreover, elective judgeships tend to favor politically
skillful candidates, or those whose names are well-known from past political campaigns.63 There is, of course, no guarantee that the qualities of a successful politician are concomitant with those that make a good judge.64
The expensive and contentious political climate which permeates partisan elections may also deter highly qualified and desirable candidates from seeking judicial office. 65 An elected judge's equivocal job security, inadequate compensation,
the continual campaigning and participation in competitive politics, and a system
that rewards the politically skillful, rather than those with superior judicial credentials, are among the factors that discourage many well-qualified lawyers from
pursuing an elective judgeship. 66 This is said to create "an implicit self-selection

55. See Hill, supra note 2, at 340.
56. See T1E BOOK OF THE STATES 1990-91, 210-11 (The Council of State Government ed., 1990).
57. Id.; SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 142 (1990). Although to a lesser extent, other states also make significant use of partisan elections to select a portion of their
judiciary. For example, Tennessee elects its supreme court and most of its trial court judges through partisan balloting. See THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 56, at 211. New York also selects much of its judiciary through
partisan election. See id.
58. See Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performanceof the Missouri Plan:JudicialSelection in the Fifiy
States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 509, 510 (1978).

59. Id.
60. See Hill, supra note 2, at 360.
61. See John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike two... :The History ofand ProspectforJudicial
Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 196 (1992).
62. Id.
63. See Hans A. Linde, ElectiveJudges: Some ComparativeComments, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1995, 1997-98
(1988). The 1988 election to the Mississippi Supreme Court of Edwin Pittman, former state Attorney General,
Secretary of State, and gubernatorial candidate, is one example of previous political experience and name recognition providing a significant benefit in a judicial election.
64. See Hill, supra note 2, at 349 (quoting A. H. McNight, How Shall OurJudges Be Selected, 5 Tx. L. REv.
470, 472-73 (1928)).
65. See DuBoIs, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 6; Felice & Klwein, supra note 61, at 195.
66. Dunois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 12, at 6.
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effect" that eliminates many of the most qualified before the selection process even
begins.67
A concern at the opposite end of the spectrum, however, is that there are few
checks inherent in the electoral process preventing the occasional election of individuals of uncertain judicial ability. 68 Although notable exceptions exist, the electorate pays little attention to judicial elections, for which empirical verification
exists that voter turnout is notoriously low. 69 Given the low visibility of judicial
elections, and often apathetic voter attitudes, such a selection process runs a grave
risk of individuals reaching the bench with virtually no consideration having been
given to whether they are qualified for the position.
The perception that voters are disinterested and uninformed contributes to "the
most fundamental and damning of the criticisms leveled against popular judicial
elections" -that they are an ineffective tool for achieving the intended purpose of
holding judges accountable to the public . "Popular control over the judiciary and
the maintenance of the principle of judicial accountability are impossible . . . if
voters know not for whom or what they are voting."7" This particular censure of
partisan elections has, however, been forcefully challenged.72 Nevertheless, and
although quite unrelated to the issue of whether judges ought to be politically accountable," the fact that voters tend not to exercise their franchise in judicial races
strongly suggests that the concept of public accountability over judges, as a whole,
may be illusory.
The adverse effect of rigorous campaigning on the administration of the court
system is another disadvantage inherent in an elective judiciary.7 4 The time spent
by incumbent judges on campaigning can dramatically decrease productivity and
substantially burden otherwise overloaded court systems." This factor is especially important in Mississippi where judicial resources are sometimes in scarce
supply. Mississippi's judiciary presently operates under a significant backlog with
court filings at all levels currently at an all time high.76 Indeed, in an effort to alleviate the current strain, the state bar is promoting the creation of an intermediate
appellate court system and provisions for additional administrative support.77
Considering the already burdensome administrative concerns faced by Missis-

67. Felice & Kilwein, supra note 61, at 195.
68. See DuBols, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 12, at 7.
69. Mary L.Volcansek, The Effects ofJudicialSelection Reform: What We Know and What We Do Not, in THE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 79, 80 (Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982). See also Dubois, Accountability, supra note
2, at 43; Glick, supm note 58, at 517.
70. DuBois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 28.
71. Id. at 33.
72. See, e.g., Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 49-5 1.
73. See id. at49.
74. See Robert F Utter, Selection and Retention - A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L.REv. 839, 845 (1973).
75. Id.
76. See S.Allan Alexander, What Does the Future Hold for the JudicialSystem in Mississippi, MISS. LAw.,
April/May 1992, at 13, 13-14.
77. Id. at 14.
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sippi judges, removing the distracting and time consuming chore of electioneering
can only enhance judicial productivity and efficiency.78
The tremendous cost of political campaigns exposes many of the more compelling liabilities of partisan election as a judicial selection mechanism. Chief among
them is that lawyers and litigants likely to appear before the judge comprise the
primary source of campaign funds. 79 Not surprisingly, therefore, avoiding the appearance of impropriety while still raising the funds necessary to conduct a successful campaign is a virtual impossibility.8" A selection system that requires
funding from the very individuals over whom judges must remain impartial arbiters is, unfortunately, open to charges that financial influence affects judicial decision-making.81 The appearance of impropriety is only heightened when spiraling
campaign costs require judges, in an effort to retire campaign debt, to continue soliciting funds from lawyers and litigants even after winning election. 82 A request
for such assistance from a newly elected judge is, obviously, difficult to refuse.8
As Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter has commented, "[tihe mere
appearance of a judge's ability to reward his supporters . . . and discriminate
against those who did not support him creates a situation which can only reduce
public confidence in the judiciary."'
Mississippi has joined other states in enacting a judicial ethics code which attempts to screen candidates from their campaign contributors by prohibiting direct
solicitation, and, instead, requiring the establishment of fund-raising committees." The use of such intermediaries, however, is criticized as an ineffective
means of keeping knowledge of contributors from candidates, especially in states
where such information is public record.8" Indeed, many contributors are unwill-

78. See generally Eugene M. Bogen, Increasing the Productivity & Efficiency of Trial Judges, Miss. LAW.,
April/May 1992, at 29.
79. See Norman Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting Such a
Method, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue) 15, 20 (1986)[hereinafter Krivosha, Merit Selection]; Donald W. Jackson &
James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Money and Politicsin JudicialElections: The 1988 Election of The ChiefJustice of the
Texas Supreme Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184, 184 (1991).
80. See Krivosha, Merit Selection, supra note 79, at 19-20; Korzen, supra note 2, at 262.
81. See Hill, supra note 2, at 341-42 (describing adverse national publicity concerning the propriety of campaign contributions to Texas judges).
82. See MATHIAS, supra note 57, at 57.
83. Id.
84. Utter, supra note 74, at 843.
85. See MATHIAS, supra note 57, at 56. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for judicial office that is filled by public election between
competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of
funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are
not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate's
committees may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than (90) days before a primary election and not
later than (90) days after last election in which he participates during the election year. A candidate should
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his
family.
MIss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 7B(2) (1974).
86. MATHIAS, supra note 57, at 56. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-805, 23-15-807 (1990) (requiring candidate to disclose information related to campaign contributors).
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ing to give unless they are convinced that the candidate will know. Moreover, even
where committees are responsible for soliciting contributions, judges attend campaign fund-raisers and cannot help but take notice of who is, and is not, present.87
Also questionable is whether this approach effectively solves the problem of extraneous contact with lawyers who regularly practice before the judge, since the
committees are generally comprised of such lawyers who continue to solicit funds
from the same pool.88
Beyond even the perceived inappropriateness of campaign fund-raising, requests for support in judicial elections result in severe pressures on the legal community.89 Lawyers may feel compelled to support an incumbent judge, concluding
that support for an unsuccessful challenger might not be well-received following
the election.9 Indeed, studies reflect that lawyers are more likely to support the
incumbent, even though they believe the opposing candidate to be more qualified. 9 Lawyers may feel obligated to give to a particular judicial campaign in order to protect their clients' interests, or may face the loss of legal work from clients
who believe that public support of the loser in a judicial contest could adversely
affect judicial decision-making. 9 2 Further, multiple judicial races represent a financial strain to lawyers receiving numerous requests for support who are unwilling to resist the instinct to cover all bases.93 Of course, financial pressures are not
limited to those from whom funds are solicited. The burden of financing outrageously expensive political campaigns may also force incumbent judges to take on
substantial personal debt in order to retain office. 94
Legal commentators have also noted that partisan campaigning for judicial office has become increasingly strident, outspoken, and controversial, thus destroying the cautious, reserved, and rational image that the judiciary should project. 9
Because the public pays closer attention to criminal justice issues than sometimes
less interesting civil matters, judicial campaigns increasingly evoke horrific images of murder weapons, electric chairs and slamming cell doors. Such imagery
obviously gains the attention of voters, but more often than not is only empty rhetoric. All too often, judicial elections lack substance due to the restrictions of judicial ethics codes, as in Mississippi, prohibiting candidates from making pledges or
promises of future performance in office or from stating views on disputed legal or

87. Krivosha, Merit Selection, supra note 79, at 20.
88. See MATHIAS, supra note 57, at 57.
89. Utter, supra note 74, at 843.
90. Id.
91. Orrin W. Johnson & Laura J. Urbis, JudicialSelection in Texass:A GatheringStorm ?, 23 TEx. TECH L. REV.
525, 550 & nn. 141 & 143 (1992).
92. Id. at 550; Utter, supra note 74, at 843.
93. Utter, supra note 74, at 843.
94. See id. at 845 (noting that some incumbent judges have been compelled to sell their homes to pay campaign costs); Mark Hansen, The High Cost ofJudging, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 44.
95. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 58, at 514; MATHIAS, supra note 57, at 31-32; PATRICK M. MCFADDEN,
ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 69-70 (1990).
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political issues .96 The advantage in accountability gained by electing public officials is lost in an atmosphere precluding meaningful debate and preventing candidates from making their views known to the electorate. 97 Substantive topics are

sometimes addressed, however, and an opponent, or interested partisan groups,
will occasionally attack an incumbent judge's record on disputed issues. 98 In such
an instance, the judge is faced with the choice of leaving perhaps debatable charges
unanswered or responding in risk of violating the ethics code.99 Placing a sitting
judge in the untenable situation of having to commit an ethical violation in order to
win an election can only serve to undermine public trust in the judiciary.100
Certainly not the least of the negative imputations against forcing judges to become partisan politicians is the potentially dangerous consequence to the unique
role and obligation of the judicial branch in our system of government. Treating
judges as if they are legislators or executives ignores the fundamental differences
in the respective functions of each. As was admirably stated by Norman Krivosha,

former chief justice of Nebraska:
It makes perfectly good sense in a free, democratic society to suggest that the
people's representatives occupying the legislative branch of government should be
selected by the people whom they are to represent. Likewise, it makes perfectly
good sense to suggest that the head of the executive branch of government should be
selected by the people whom he or she represents. It makes no sense at all to talk

96. See Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 37. This prohibition is included in the Mississippi Code of
Judicial Conduct, which states:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled. . . by public election between competing candidates... :
should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues;
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
Miss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1974).

97. As noted by one Illinois supreme court justice:
What are two judicial candidates who run against each other supposed to say to the voters? Is one candidate going to promise more justice than his opponent? Are they going to pledge to find more people guilty
or more people innocent, or sentence more people to death? Are they going to pledge to be for or against
statutes permitting or prohibiting abortions, without waiting to hear any arguments? Even if candidates
wanted to, the canons ofjudicial ethics forbid such outrageous conduct. Invariably candidates for judicial
office are reduced to bland statements that seldom get mentioned in the newspapers. That is why judicial
contests leave even the most conscientious citizens apathetic and disinterested.
Hill, supra note 2, at 358 (quoting S. Simon, After "Greylord"What?, Address to the Chicago Bar Association and
Illinois State Bar Association, Dinner Honoring Illinois Supreme Court (Nov. 4, 1983) (available at University of
Chicago Law Review)).
The restrictions on meaningful debate can sometimes lead to absurd campaign rhetoric. For example, in a
1992 primary campaign for a Mississippi Supreme Court post, one candidate, in an obvious play on recessionary
fears, indicated that a vote for him would improve the state's job climate. Another candidate implied that, if
elected, he would eliminate plea bargaining in the supreme court. These issues, quite obviously, have no relevance to election to an appellate court. They are, however, an outgrowth of the prohibitions against substantive
debate injudicial elections. Clearly, judicial ethics codes represent arestraint on free speech and fair comment by
judicial candidates. Recognizing that "[vioters need and judges are entitled to judicial freedom of speech," Oregon has abandoned Canon 7 of the ABA's judicial ethics code for a rule that restricts only those comments that
would "disqualify ajudge in an actual case or undermine confidence in the political nonpartisanship of the judiciary." Linde, supra note 63, at 2001.
98. Korzen, supra note 2, at 261.
99. Id.
100. See Linde, supra note 63, at 2001.

19921

IN SEARCH OFAN INDEPENDENTJUDICIARY

about representation when examining thejudicial branch of government. Legislators
have constituents and, therefore, should be popularly elected. Governors have constituents and, therefore, should also be popularly elected. Judges are prohibited by
law from having constituents; therefore, subjecting them to popular election is totally without reason.101
Individuals desirous of making their views known have a perfect right to approach and lobby their legislators or executives.' 02 Similar contacts with a judge,
however, are improper. When the people disagree with the law, their efforts are
appropriately directed toward their elected representatives. Unpopular court holdings can be changed by enactment of new laws. Constitutions can be amended.
Judges, however, must remain impartial decision-makers, not advocates. As expressed by former Texas Supreme Court Justice John Hill:
The point cannot be over-emphasized: a judge is not an advocate. A judge's role
is not to "push" an agenda or champion any particular point of view. Rather, advocacy in courts is peculiarly the role of the lawyer. Our adversary system contemplates that both sides to a dispute, including a criminal prosecution, have the
opportunity to be represented by a trained advocate. The public good does not require that judges be advocates for particular causes, but rather that they be fair and
impartial persons. When all of this is considered, partisan politics proves to be a particularly undesirable mechanism for judicial selection.10
The pressures of partisan politics threaten to undermine the impartial, anti-majoritarian role ofjudges. Allowing the fates ofjudges to be utterly dependent on the
passing whims of public perception cannot help but adversely affect judicial decision-making. As discussed in the following section, instead of applying the law in
an impartial and neutral fashion, the reality of a looming election may well cause a
judge's first concern not to be an issue's legal correctness, but what its political impact will be on the electorate. 4 If such continues to be the case, the ideal of an
independent judiciary in Mississippi will become a long-forgotten memory.
B. A Recent Example
Mississippi has recently experienced an unfortunate exhibition of how vulnerable judicial independence is when combined with partisan politics. In the words of
one Mississippi newspaper, the March 1992 Democratic primary between incumbent Mississippi Supreme Court Justice James L. Robertson and former Chancery

101. Krivosha, Merit Selection, supra note 79, at 16 (footnote omitted). See also Norman Krivosha, In Celebra-

tion of the 50th Anniversary ofMeritSelection, 74 JUDICATURE 128, 131 (1990) [hereinafter Krivosha, In Celebration].
102. See Krivosha, Merit Selection, supra note 79, at 16-17.
103. Hill, supra note 2, at 361 (footnote omitted).
104. Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus has noted:
"There's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions,
especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in
your bathtub."
Utter, supra note 10, at 19 (quoting from Paul Reidinger, The Politics ofJudging, A.B.A. J., April 1, 1987, at 52,

58).
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Judge James L. Roberts, Jr., "demonstrates the folly of electing judges, the public
office that most needs to be removed from politics." 105 That an incumbent justice
suffered defeat is certainly a noteworthy event, but of greater consequence is the
manner in which the campaign was marred by volatile attacks by victim's rights
advocates and Mississippi prosecutors who joined in a concerted effort to oppose
Justice Robertson's re-election. 0 6 The focal point of the assault was his record on
capital punishment, which was depicted as "virtually ha[ving] done away with the
death penalty." 07
The Mississippi Prosecutor's Association's public endorsement of Judge Roberts' candidacy, through a one-page resolution based on a vote of its board of directors, was perhaps the most dramatic event of the campaign.108 The resolution
maintained that Roberts "best represents the views of the law abiding citizens in
regards to the administration of criminal justice in this state."109 It offered the further view, impressively long on rhetoric but short on factual support, that decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court had created "judicial turmoil and chaos",
"tied the hands of prosecutors and law officers", "denied justice", and had "given
criminal defendants rights not required by the constitution."110

105. Re-elect Robertson; Stop Electing Judges, NORrHEAST Miss. DAILY J. (Tupelo, Miss.), March 6, 1992, at 2
[hereinafter Re-elect Robertson]. The fact that this article examines only the 1992 Robertson/Roberts election
campaign (and then only in relatively brief fashion) is not intended to suggest that there have not been other campaigns of equal, or greater, empirical value in demonstrating significant uncertainties of partisan election as a
judicial selection device. The defeat of former Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Joel Blass in 1990, and the
1992 Republican supreme court primary in the Central District, are also excellent examples deserving of close
examination. The undermining ofjudicial independence inherent in the comprehensive distortion and manipulation ofJustice Robertson's record through the partisan electoral process, however, is the reason that this particular election is chosen for discussion.
106. See Carole Lawes & Beverly P. Kraft, High Court Judge Coddled Criminals, CriticsSay, THE CLARIONLEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), March 13, 1992, at BI.
107. Id. Needless to say, the prospect that one out of nine justices on a state supreme court could individually
have "virtually" done away with capital punishment is remote at best.
108. Id. The full text of the resolution follows:
BE IT RESOLVED that the Mississippi Prosecutor's Association, by a vote taken by the Board of Directors in Jackson, Mississippi on January 23, 1992, endorses the candidacy of former Public Safety
Commissioner, Judge James L. Roberts, Jr. for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi
from the Northern District, Post I, District III.
The membership of the Mississippi Prosecutor's Association feels that Judge James L. Roberts, Jr. best represents the views of the law abiding citizens in regards
to the administration of criminal justice in this state. The judicial turmoil and chaos created by procedural
decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court have tied the hands of prosecutors and law officers in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of this State. Recent Mississippi Supreme Court rulings have caused
unnecessary delays, denied justice, unreasonably increased costs to taxpayers and given criminal defendants rights not required by the constitution. We feel that as a Justice on the Mississippi Supreme Court,
Judge James L. Roberts, Jr. will give the crime victims and the good, honest and law abiding people of
this state a hearing at least as fair as that of the criminal in child abuse, death penalty and other serious
criminal cases. Having been County Attorney of Pontotoc County for twelve years, a former active member of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association, Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Mississippi for four years, and since 1988, as a Chancery Judge of the First Judicial District, Judge James L.
Roberts, Jr. knows the practical problems faced by prosecutors and law enforcement in the day-to-day
administration of criminal justice in the courtroom. We urge the citizens of the Northern District of Mississippi to vote for and elect Judge James L. Roberts, Jr. as Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Resolution of the Mississippi Prosecutor's Association (Jan. 23, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Resolution].
109. Resolution, supra note 108.
110. Id.
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The improvident decision of government lawyers to publicly oppose a sitting
judge before whom the State of Mississippi regularly appeals shows, at the very
least, a remarkable disregard for judicial independence, and apparent disrespect
for the respective roles of prosecutor and judge. The action may be explained by
the fact that Mississippi's district attorneys are also elected officials and must periodically face the voters in order to retain their jobs.111 Court decisions involving
crime and punishment, daily fare on television and in newspapers, may, in the eyes
of voters, reflect on a prosecutor's job performance, especially where unpopular
reversals of criminal convictions may be the result of errors by lawyers or law enforcement officials. Prosecutors, themselves confronted with competitive elections, may thus find that it makes political sense to attack an incumbent judge in
defense of his or her own job tenure. 1 2 Political expediency, however, hardly justifies interference with the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, especially by
officers of the court whose obligation to protect the rights of criminal defendants
should be as equally unflagging as that of judges. Even leaving aside the issue of
propriety, 113 this action dramatically confirms the dangers of involving judges in
partisan politics. The judiciary's independence depends on insulation from retributive attacks by governmental entities and officials whose actions it must regularly
review.
Equally reproachful, however, was the relentless and comprehensive campaign
of distortion waged against Justice Robertson's record, primarily focused on various criminal appeals decided during his tenure. Much of the misinformation was
presented to the electorate by way of a lengthy and, not surprisingly, anonymous

I11. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-193 (1990).
112. As a Northeast MississippiDailyJournaleditorial cogently noted prior to the election:
It is a dangerous peculiarity in Mississippi that men and women expected to impartially interpret the law
sometimes become embroiled in campaigns based on emotions and feelings having nothing to do with
what the law clearly requires.
Placing judges in the political arena makes them unfair targets fbr people or groups who seek to blame
one person for ajudgment that may have been handed down by a 9-0 majority of the Supreme Court. The
judgments of courts sometimes point out the errorsof lawyers who then seek to cover theirflaws by appealing to the anger and frustrationof people who feel wronged. . . . Judges sometimes must rule on seemingly small points of law because the Constitution of the United States requires due process and equal
protection for all citizens-even those who are an abomination in the eyes of society. A legal technicality
to one person is another person's basic constitutional right.
Re-elect Robertson, supra note 105, at 2 (emphasis added). In this regard, politically motivated attacks during an
election campaign, no matter the source, may actually be assisted by the restrictions of the judicial ethics code,
which would make it highly unlikely that an adequate response, if any, could be made by ajudicial candidate. See
supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
113. See Linde, supra note 63, at 2003 (noting that Oregon's elected attorney general "regards it as improper
for government lawyers identifying themselves as such to support or oppose the judges before whom the state
appeals"); see also Dick Thornburgh, Prosecutors and the Press in the Search for the Truth, the Whole Truth and
Nothing But the Truth, 75 JUDICATURE 20, 21 (1991) (reflecting that the prosecutor's obligation to protect the
rights of the defendant and the integrity of the judicial process requires that he or she not act from political motives).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 13:1

circular distributed during the campaign.' 14 For example, based on his dissenting
opinion in Clemons v. State,11 Robertson was described as believing a defendant
who "shot an unarmed pizza delivery boy in cold-blood" had not committed a
crime serious enough to warrant the death penalty.' 16 The truth, however, is that
Justice Robertson concurred in the affirmance of Clemons' capital murder conviction." 7 The dissent was, instead, concerned with the lower court's instruction to
the jury, during sentencing, that an aggravating circumstance existed if the crime
was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."11 Justice Robertson argued that the
United States Supreme Court had, in Maynard v. Cartwright,119 reviewed identical
language in an Oklahoma statute and found it unconstitutionally vague.120 The dissent maintained, therefore, that the case should be remanded for resentencing.121
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the sentence in Clemons v. Mississippi,122 although under a different rationale than suggested by Justice Robertson. 123
Another Robertson dissent, in Minnick v. State,1 24 received similar treatment. 121 In Minnick, the defendant, who in a previous interrogation had requested
and been provided with counsel, was compelled by law enforcement officers to attend another interview without his lawyer.1 2' The Mississippi Supreme Court,
with Justice Robertson alone in dissent, concluded that the subsequent confession
was not taken in violation of Minnick's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. 127 The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed, holding that the
officers were prohibited from reinstating interrogation without the presence of

114. See David G. Sansing, Campaign Ads Against Robertson are Misleading (Letters to the Editor), ThE
February 28, 1992, at 4. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough, however, that
the materials in question are attributable to partisans that were neither involved in, nor subject to the control of,
Judge Robert's campaign organization. Interview with William Liston, Chairman of the Committee to Re-Elect
Justice James Lawton Robertson, in Winona, Miss. (May 9, 1992).
115. 535 So. 2d 1354 (Miss. 1988), revd, 110 S.Ct. 1441 (1990).
116. Memorandum of the Robertson Re-Election Committee in Response to Charges Concerning Justice Robertson's Record 5 (on file with author).
117. 535 So. 2d at 1367 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
120. Clemons, 535 So. 2d at 1367-68 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1371.
122. l10S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
123. Justice Robertson's Clemons dissent noted that the "unmistakable effect of the majority's opinion" was that
it had performed the jury's function of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 535 So. 2d at 1371.
The Supreme Court held, however, that it is constitutionally permissible for a state appellate court to uphold a
death sentence based in part on an improperly defined aggravating circumstance by either reweighing aggravating
and mitigating circumstances or under harmless error review. Clemons, 110 S.Ct. at 1444. Nevertheless, on
remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it lacked authority under state law to engage in a reweighing
analysis and that the error in instructing the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Clemons v. State,
593 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Miss. 1992). The case was, therefore, remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. Id.
124. 551 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990).
125. See Sansing, supra note 114, at 4.
126. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486,488-89 (1990).
127. Id. at 489; Minnick, 551 So. 2d at 101 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH,
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Minnick's counsel. 12 8 Materials distributed to the voters, however, stated only that
Justice Robertson had dissented, without disclosing the Court's subsequent reversal of the majority opinion on the precise grounds which had been urged by Justice
Robertson. 12 9
Justice Robertson was also criticized for his vote to reverse the capital conviction in Bevil v. State,13 a highly publicized case involving the kidnapping, rape
and murder of an eighteen-year old woman.131 Again, however, the distributed information discussed only Justice Robertson's vote; 132 it did not mention that the
vote had been unanimous to reverse and remand for a new trial because an admisofficers without a Miranda warning was
sion by Bevill elicited by law enforcement
133
erroneously introduced into evidence.
The foregoing discussion represents a very small, but representative, sampling
of the deceptive message given to the voters regarding Justice Robertson's work on
the court. That such misinformation is so easily disseminated is simply another
demonstration of the unreliability of partisan election as a method of judicial selection. A similar election year attack could just as easily have been waged against
any of the justices currently on Mississippi's supreme court. Appellate courts, unlike trial courts, involve collegial decision making. In other words, before an appellate judge can affect the result of an appeal, another judge (or judges) must
agree, or a majority of a higher court if the judge's views are in dissent. This concept is often difficult for voters to accept and, therefore, unpopular appellate decisions may, regardless of authorship, result in the vilification of any judge
unfortunate enough to be running for re-election during the latest public controversy. 34
' As was the case for Justice Robertson, "opponents will attack the court's
result without regard to its reasons. "1135
There can be little defense for ajudicial selection system where judges are politically vulnerable simply because their decisions are legally correct. 36 Objectivity
and impartiality become the exception to the rule in a system that so promotes selfprotective judicial decision-making. 137 There have been numerous calls in Mississippi to abandon the selection of judges in such a blatantly political manner. 13 8 If
these warnings are not heeded, the level of competence and integrity expected of

128. Minnick, Ill S. Ct. at 491.
129. See Sansing, supra note 114, at 4.
130. 556 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1990).
131. See Sansing, supra note 114, at 4; Lawes & Kraft, supra note 106, at B1.
132. See Sansing, supra note 114, at 4.
133. Bevill, 556 So. 2d at 700.
134. See Linde, supra note 63, at 2001.
135. Id. at 2000.
136. Id. at 2001.
137. Nicholas P. Lovrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28, 28
(1989).
138. See, e.g., Re-elect Robertson, supra note 105, at 2; Supreme Court: State District Dispute Settled Now?,
THE CLARION LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), July 19, 1992, at 4G; Alex A. Alston, Jr., President'sColumn: Sanctity
of the Courts, Miss. LAW., April/May 1992, at 7.
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Mississippi's judiciary may end up a sacrifice on the altar of political accountability.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SELECTION METHODS

For a state inclined to abandon partisan election as its method of judicial selection,13 9 there exist three major alternatives: (1) non-partisan election; (2) appointment; and (3) commission selection.14 This seeming simplicity, however, is
belied by the number of contrasting approaches to selecting judges developed
among the states.141 Many states have devised "hybrid systems" in which different
levels of the judiciary are selected by completely different systems '42States may
also fill vacancies in judicial offices in a manner unlike that used for initial selection. " This section will offer a brief discussion of the major alternatives to partisan election with particular emphasis on commission selection, considered the
most popular of the selection systems.'"

139. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Section 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), prohibits states from
implementing voting procedures that act as a denial of the right to vote because of race or color. States, including
Mississippi, with a history of"substantial voting discrimination" are required by section 5 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c, to submit changes in their voting procedures to the United States Attorney General or to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301,329 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has held that section 2 and section 5 of the Act apply tojudicial elections. Chisom v. Roemer, I IIS. Ct. 2354, 2366 (1991).
The Court recently signaled, however, that a state's decision to convert its judicial selection system from popular election to a non-elective process would not run afoul of the Voting Rights Act. In Chisom, the Court noted:
The [Fifth Circuit, in League of UnitedLatin American Citizens CouncilNo. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d
620, 622 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 2376 (1991)] was, of course, entirely correct in observing
that "judges need not be elected at all," and that ideally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's
role because the judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment. The Framers
of the Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be sheltered from public
opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection. Indeed, these views were generally shared by the
States during the early years of the Republic. Louisiana, however, has chosen a different course. It has
decided to elect its judges and to compel judicial candidates to vie for popular support just as other political candidates do.
The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office . . . . Louisiana could, of course, exclude its
judiciaryfrom the coverage ofthe Voting Rights Act by changingto a system in which judges are appointed,
andin that way, it could enable its judges to be indifferent to popularopinion. The reasons why Louisiana
has chosen otherwise are precisely the reasons why it is appropriate for § 2, as well as § 5, of the Voting
Rights Act to continue to apply to its judicial elections.
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2366-67 (emphasis added) (citation and footnotes omitted). For further discussion of this
issue, see Johnson & Urbis, supra note 91, at 525-28 & nn.8-9. See generally Suzanne G. Marsh, Comment,
Judges as Representatives Under the Voting Rights Act, 22 CuMB. L. REv. 331 (1992).
140. Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue) 53, 57
(1986).
141. Id.
142. Id. See also TE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 56, at 210-12 (describing in detail the various modes of
judicial selection utilized by the states and United States territories).
143. Champagne, supra note 140, at 57. As discussed, Mississippi is such a state. See supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
144. See Glick, supra note 58, at 509-10.
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A. Non-partisanElection
The first alternative to partisan judicial elections was developed by midwestern
and western states entering the union in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 145 Progressive reformers hoped that non-partisan elections would allow
voters to focus on candidates' individual traits without regard to political considerations.146 The goal of non-partisan elections is to remove judicial elections from
party politics, freeing candidates from partisan obligations and allowing voters to
decide on the basis of merit, rather than party affiliation.147 Non-partisan ballots
are intended to avoid straight party voting, thus preventing judicial candidates
from becoming enmeshed in the "sweep factor", where, because of volatile political events, legislative and executive officials of one party are swept out of office in
favor of candidates from the other. 1" In a further effort to limit the influence of
party politics, some states schedule judicial elections in off-years. 149
Despite the laudable objective of removing judges from party politics, critics
argue that non-partisan elections "are in many respects worse than partisan judicial elections."150 Foremost among the criticisms is that non-partisan elections
have even lower visibility and voter participation than do partisan elections. 15 1 In
fact, studies have shown that voter participation decreases in proportion to increases in effort to remove judicial elections from partisan politics.152 Because of
the paucity of information typically available in judicial elections, voters tend to
rely heavily on party cues as a determining factor. 5 3 Without the party label, confusion tends to discourage voters from even casting ballots in non-partisan elections. 154 To the extent that accountability can be measured in terms of voter
participation, therefore, non-partisan elections have even less to offer in that regard than do partisan elections. Nor are concerns for judicial independence satisfied, as non-partisan elections do little to shield judges from the transitory whims
of majoritarian electoral politics. Moreover, all of the more tangible disadvantages
to electing judges, such as fund-rasing, high cost, and time spent away from judicial duties because of campaigning, remain intact.
B. Appointment
The appointive system may be possessed of more notoriety than any other,
given the consistently high public interest in the appointment of federal judges, especially those appointed to the United States Supreme Court. Although a few
145. Champagne, supra note 140, at 57; Korzen, supra note 2, at 269.
146. Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 45.
147. Champagne, supra note 140, at 63.
148. DuBois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 7; Champagne, supra note 140, at 63; Korzen, supra
note 2, at 269.
149. Champagne, supra note 140, at 63.
150. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 12, at 7-8.
151. Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 45; Champagne, supra note 140, at 63.
152. Champagne, supra note 140, at 63.
153. Id.; Dubois, Accountability,supra note 2, at 45.
154. Dubois, Accountability, supra note 2, at 45.
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states follow the federal model of executive appointment and senatorial confirmation,"' state appointive systems are extremely diverse, and include appointment
by the governor, legislature, or sitting judges,' 56 and confirmation by executive
councils or legislative bodies. 5 7
The appointive system is greatly dependent on the appointing officer's discretion,158 who in most instances is an elected official. Consequently, appointive systems substitute one form of political pressure for another. Although the system
removes judges from electoral politics, judicial appointments become critical
components in the partisan election campaigns of the appointing officer."5 9 Partisan concerns, therefore, may factor into appointments, with considerations such
as ideology or party loyalty overriding issues of individual merit.' 60 The strength
of the appointive system, however, is its maximization of judicial independence,
due to the lack of any significant restraint on the judge after confirmation.' 6' For
those who believe that accountability should be the centerpiece of judicial selection, this is also its weakness.' 62
C. Nominating Commissions (MeritSelection)
The most recent vintage of judicial selection systems is commission selection,
popularly known as the Merit Plan or the Missouri Plan, after the first state to
adopt the design in 1940.163 Commission selection was developed by reformers in
the early decades of this century as a response to the populist notion that judges
should be elected and subordinate to the will of the people.' 64 Historians trace the
roots of the plan to an address given by Roscoe Pound, then dean of the University
of Nebraska law school, to the American Bar Association in 1906, entitled "The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." 65 Discussing the burgeoning discontent with the elective judiciary, Pound stated: "Putting
courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench." 66 This cli-

155. Maine, New Jersey and Rhode Island select at least a portion of their judiciary in this manner. See THE
BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 56, at 210-11.

156. Champagne, supra note 140, at 57. For example, Alaska, Iowa, Mississippi, Ohio, and South Dakota provide for sitting judges to make appointments to various judicial offices. See THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note

56, at 210-11; see also supra note 47.
157. Champagne, supra note 140, at 58.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. For a good discussion of the politicization of the judicial branch, particularly in the federal appointment process, see James L. Robertson, Of Bork and Basics, 60 Miss. L.J. 439 (1990) (reviewing RoBEirr H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)).
161. Champagne, supra note 140, at 58.
162. Id.
163. See Richard A. Watson, Observations on the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue)
1, 1-2 (1986); Korzen, supra note 2, at 271.
164. See Krivosha, In Celebration, supra note 101, at 128.
165. Id.
166. Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Planfor Judicial Selection and Tenure - Its HistoricalDevelopment, 7 DuQ.
L. REv. 61, 64 (1968).
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mate of dissatisfaction led to the founding of the American Judicature Society in
1913, and the evolution of the commission selection system.167
Although numerous variations exist, the system's basic structure includes a permanent non-partisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers, appointed by various public and private officials, who recruit and screen judicial candidates. 168 In
addition to lawyers and lay persons, many commissions also include a judicial
member.16 9 The commission submits a list of nominees, generally containing between three and five names, to the executive, who must make an appointment
from the list.17 After an initial period of service, an uncontested, non-partisan
election is held, during which the sole question decided by the electorate is
whether the judge should be retained in office. 71 Should a majority vote be cast
for retention, the judge will serve a fixed term before facing another retention
election. 172
Advocates believe that commission selection offers several advantages over
popular election of judges. First, the selection process is improved by removing
the participation of political parties and interest groups, because partisan affiliation and connections are rendered irrelevant for recruitment. 7 3 Consequently,
"[t]he absence of party primaries and reelection contests will free judges from continuous partisan political obligations, permitting them to become genuinely independent both on and off the bench and able to devote themselves full-time to their
court duties." 74 Further, by directing the selection process toward professional
qualifications, highly qualified and desirable candidates are more likely to permit
themselves to be considered forjudicial office, thus improving the overall quality
of the judiciary.17 While not promising that every judge selected will be excellent,
supporters note that commission selection tends to eliminate the highly incompetent.176 Finally, because pervasive political pressures have been removed, independence and impartiality in judicial decision-making should be enhanced, as
partisan and self-protective motivations for decisions are no longer present.177
Commission selection is celebrated as an attractive compromise on the continuum of judicial independence and public accountability, landing somewhere be-

167. Id. at 64-65. For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the commission selection system,
see Krivosha, In Celebration, supra note 101; and Winters, supra note 166.
168. Korzen, supra note 2, at 271.
169. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 53, at 26.
170. Korzen, supra note 2, at 271.
171. Id.
172. Champagne, supra note 140, at 61. A second major form of commission selection is referred to as the
California plan. Id. Under this variation, instead of preparing a list of nominees, the commission enjoys veto
power over the executive's nominee. Id.
173. Glick, supra note 58, at 513.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Watson, supra note 163, at 5.
177. Glick, supra note 58, at 513.
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tween the extremes of gubernatorial appointment and partisan election. 178 Critics
maintain, however, that far from eliminating politics from the process, commission selection merely substitutes "a somewhat subterranean process of bar and
bench politics that is far removed from popular control."I79 Even its supporters acknowledge that no system is completely immune from political influences, and
that each jurisdiction adopting commission selection has had to struggle to insure
that the effect of partisan politics is limited.180
The foundation of commission selection is the nominating commission, rendering the effectiveness of the system greatly dependent upon the successful functioning of this body.181 As would be expected, therefore, the greatest potential for
disruptive political influence is present in the appointment, and performance, of
the commissioners. Lawyer members of the commission are often appointed by
governing officials of the state bar, while non-lawyer members are usually selected by the governor. 182 Critics maintain that the executive is thus able to appoint
his own supporters or party loyalists, allowing partisan politics to play a heightened role in the selection process.183 Although non-lawyer members are considered desirable to promote public involvement in the process, the system is intended
to remove the executive's opportunity to make politically motivated judicial appointments." 4 It is considered a contradiction, therefore, to allow the executive a
direct voice in the appointment of nominating commissioners. 185 One suggestion
for remedying this problem is appointment of lay members through a bi-partisan
186
legislative committee.
The potential for political machinations within the inner workings of the commission is also a serious concern. Should the executive be able to exert a dominant
influence, "pre-selection" may occur, where the favored choice of the governor is
included on the submitted list. 187 The reverse occurs when commission members
with political or personal goals of their own engage in "panel rigging," by submitting a list of nominees with only one legitimate candidate.18 8 Philosophical differences between plaintiff and defense bars can also lead to tensions in the
appointment of lawyer members to the commission and in the actual selection
178. Champagne, supra note 140, at 58, 61; William M. Pearson& David S. Castle, AlternativeJudicialSelection Devices: An Analysis of TerasJudge'sAttitudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34, 34 (1989).
179. Beth M. Henschenet al., JudicialNominatingCommissioners:A NationalProfile, 73 JUDICATURE 328, 329
(1990).
180. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 53, at 70-71.
181. Id. at22.
182. Id. at25.
183. Champagne, supranote 140, at 61; Glick, supra note 58, at 521.
184. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 53, at 25.

185. Id.
186. Id. The value of including non-lawyers on the commissions has been strongly questioned. The lack of an
understanding of the judicial process raises concerns that lay members are subject to undue influence by the lawyer or judicial commission members, or will simply defer to the legal expertise of others. Id. One method of
addressing this concern is to emphasize training in the selection process for non-lawyer members prior to the
initial term of service. See Watson, supra note 163, at 6.
187. Korzen, supranote 2, at 272.
188. McClellan, supra note 21, at 548.
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process.189 In an effort to avoid manipulation of the process through lobbying of
commission members, including by the executive and members of the bar, reformers recommend the implementation of preventive rules and procedures.1 9
These include requiring that all written communications received by one commission member be forwarded to all members, and that all oral communications with
members be reduced to writing.191 Further, in an effort to discourage "pre-selection," such rules would preclude commission members from initiating or receiving any communication from the governor concerning any candidate prior to
completion of the list.1 92
Commission selection opponents have also expressed concern that the process
could potentially be used to exclude women and minorities from judicial positions.1 93 Supporters, however, maintain that commission selection actually provides more opportunities for women and minorities than do judicial elections.194
One way to alleviate such fears is to promote heterogeneity among the nominating
commissioners.' 95 Thus, in an effort to bolster public confidence and credibility,
some state systems include provisions for ethnic and gender diversity on their
nominating commissions. 96 Thoughtful and careful selection Df a commission's
membership is the decisive factor in whether it acts in a legitimately representative
and non-partisan manner.1 97
A substantial amount of criticism directed toward commission selection is reserved for its retention election component. Retention elections are an attempt to
balance public accountability concerns against the measure of judicial independence provided by nominating commissions.'" Because this form of election
lacks traditional voting cues, such as party affiliation and competitive campaigning,1 99 however, commentators have questioned the degree of accountability actually provided.2"' The low voter turnout typical of other types of judicial elections
is an even larger obstacle in retention elections.21 Because the judge runs only on
his or her record, and not against a live opponent, retention elections do not generate the publicity necessary to allow the public to cast an informed vote.20 2 There is

189. See Champagne, supra note 140, at 61-62.
190. See Theodore McMillan, Selection of State Court Judges, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue) 9, 12-13 (1986).
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id. at 12-13.
193. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 58, at 522; Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems andJudicial
Characteristics:The Recruitment of State Supreme CourtJudges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 230 (1987).
194. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 190, at 10; Krivosha, Merit Selection, supra note 79, at 19.
195. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 53, at 228; JudicialNominating Commissions - The Need for DemographicDiversity, 74 JUDICATURE 236, 236 (199 1)[hereinafter JudicialNominatingCommissions].
196. JudicialNominating Commissions, supra note 195, at 236.
197. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 53, at 227-28.
198. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 4, at 340; The Needfor JudicialPerformanceEvaluationsfor Retention Elections, 75JUDICATURE 124, 178 (1991).
199. Hall & Aspin, supra note 4, at 340.
200. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 140, at 62; McClellan, supra note 21, at 549.
201. Hall & Aspin, supra note 4, at 342.
202. Id.
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also apprehension that low voter participation allows well-organized special interests to control retention elections, creating the possibility that judges will rely on
such groups for campaign funding.2 0 One way to increase the expectation that voters will cast an informed ballot, thus improving the effectiveness of retention elections, is for state bar associations to assist the public by providing information on
judicial candidates.24
V. Mississipi'S

FLEETING MERIT SELECTION EXPERIENCE

In most judicial election states, including Mississippi, the governor is vested
with the power to fill mid-term vacancies in judicial offices by appointment.2 05 It
is, in fact, a common occurrence for judges in an elective system to first reach the
bench by executive appointment to positions vacated because of resignation, retirement, or death within a regular term of office.2 6 Many governors have voluntarily established nonbinding commission selection mechanisms to assist in
making these appointments.27 Such a system was implemented in Mississippi in
1980, when then Governor William Winter, by executive order, established the
Judicial Nominating Committee for use in filling mid-term vacancies in the supreme court, and circuit, chancery, and county courts.2"8 The committee continued to function during the succeeding administrations of Governors William
Allain and Ray Mabus, 0 9 but was not revived, however, following the election of
Governor Kirk Fordice in 199 1. 20
The committee as established by Governor Winter consisted of nineteen members who served staggered three-year terms.211 Six members were appointed by
the governor from each of the three supreme court districts, as well as a nineteenth
member who chaired the committee.212 Three members from each district were
required to be lawyers, whose appointments were recommended to the governor
by the president of the Mississippi State Bar.2" 3 The remaining members from each
district could be, but were not required to be, lawyers. 2" 4 It was requisite that the
203. Id.
204. Id. at 342-43; Watson, supra note 163, at 6.
205. See DUBOiS, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 5; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
206. W. St. John Garwood, JudicialRevision - An Argumentfor the MeritPlanfor JudicialSelectionand Tenure,
5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,4-5 (1973).
207. DuBois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 12, at 5.
208. Miss. Exec. Order No. 334 (Gov. William F Winter, Aug. 27, 1980) (on file with author).
209. Interview with Luther T. Munford, former Judicial Nominating Committee member, in Jackson, Miss.
(June 19, 1992) [hereinafter Munford Interview].
210. Telephone interview with R. Andrew Taggart, Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Kirk Fordice (Aug. 31,
1992). Although he considers the former nominating committee a commendable effort to eliminate partisan politics from the appointive process, Governor Fordice is of the view that judicial appointments are uniquely the role
of the executive, and that bar and bench politics often associated with such committees render them an undesirable method of selection. Id. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Alternatively, prior to exercising his
appointment authority, Governor Fordice actively solicits applications and recommendations from lawyers and
other interested groups in the jurisdiction in which the vacancy occurs. Taggart interview, supra.
211. Exec. Order No. 334, supra note 208.
212. Id. 2.
213. Id. 2(c).
214. Id. 2(b).
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committee chair be a lawyer and have previously served on the committee for at
least one year.2 1 The vacancy created was filled by appointment of a new member
from the same district.216 In an effort to avoid the appearance of internal lobbying,
no committee member was eligible for appointment to judicial office or reappointment to the committee until one year following either resignation or completion of
his or her term.217
In considering vacancies on the supreme court, the entire committee membership sought and evaluated applications of potential nominees.218 Circuit, chancery, and county court openings, however, were reviewed by a sub-committee,
comprised of the six members appointed from each supreme court district, responsible for the jurisdiction in which the vacancy occurred.219 Upon occurrence
of a vacancy, the committee, or the appropriate sub-committee, solicited applications through notification of newspapers, the state and local bar associations,
court clerks, and any other bar or citizen organization deemed appropriate .220 Applicants then submitted completed questionnaires containing background information from which the committee chair, or sub-committee chair, screened out
unqualified applicants. 221 The committee obtained additional information through
investigations and personal interviews to assist in evaluating the candidates' qualifications.222

Nominees were required to be certified by the committee as "fully qualified"
before being recommended to the governor.223 To make this certification, the
committee had to find that the nominee possessed (1) all qualifications required
by law for the particular office, 224 and (2) "the personal qualities and attributes of
character and experience, judicial temperament, professional competence and
other personal characteristics essential to the particular judgeship involved necessary to fully qualify a person to serve the public as a judicial officer." 225 Following
the investigatory and deliberative processes, the committee selected and recommended for appointment three nominees for vacancies in circuit, chancery, and
county courts, and five nominees for supreme court vacancies. 226 Because the

215. Id. 2(d).
216. Id.
217. Id. 3.
218. Id. 7.
219. Id. 4-5.
220. Id.
5, 7; Operating Rules of the Judicial Nominating Committee and Sub-Committees, 15 (adopted
under authority of Miss. Exec. Order No. 334) (on file with author).
221. Operating Rules, supranote 220,
17-18. However, panel members received the names of all applicants
and could bring up for review any candidate eliminated in the initial screening process. Id. 18.
222. Id.
19-20, 23. For example, the investigation would attempt to "determine from reliable sources" the
capability of applicants to administer justice without regard to race, color, gender, religion, national origin, or
financial standing. Id. 20.
223. Exec. Order No. 334, supra note 208, 9.
224. See supr notes 47 and 50 and accompanying text.
225. Exec. Order No. 334, supm note 208, 8.
226. Id. 6-7.
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committee's recommendations were nonbinding, the governor had the right to reject any or all of the nominees .227
Governor Allain utilized the nominating system as it had been established by
his predecessor.228 Following his election in 1987, however, Governor Mabus issued a new executive order altering the system in certain areas, but which left the
committee's basic structure intact. 229 The separate post of committee chair was
eliminated, reducing the committee membership to eighteen, one of whom was
appointed to chair the committee .230 The time period for the committee to make its
recommendations was expanded from ten to thirty days, and voting procedures
were simplified. 231' Further, the order mandated that the governor and the president of the state bar insure that the committee's membership was not limited to a
particular race, gender, or interest group. 23 2 The operating rules promulgated un'der the order's authority made other significant improvements in the committee's
operation. For example, a provision establishing procedures in the event of a conflict of interest was included,233 and, where the former operating rules had simply
stated that members were not prevented from soliciting applications from persons
they believed to be qualified for judicial office, language in the new rules encouraged members to actively seek out persons of the highest qualifications and invite
their applications .234
Although the Judicial Nominating Committee enjoyed a relatively brief existence, it represented a significant change in Mississippi's method of judicial selection. Unlike partisan election, it provided a mechanism for an in-depth review of a
candidate's qualifications priorto that person ascending the bench. Of greater import, it eliminated the electoral risk of a skillful or well-connected, but otherwise
professionally unqualified, politician achieving judicial office. By providing the
benefit of its collective professional judgment, the committee also acted as a
check, albeit a voluntary one, on the executive's usually uncurbed appointment
power. Judges reaching the bench through the committee process, however, received only a temporary reprieve from the omnipresent political pressures of Mississippi's judicial election system. Because these judges were required to win a
partisan election to retain their office, 2 5 the short-lived committee was unable to
serve the judiciary's need for independence. For example, when appointed to the

227. Id. 11.
228. Munford interview, supra note 209.
229. Miss. Exec. Order No. 587 (Gov. Ray Mabus, March 18, 1988) (on file with author). This order is included in the appendices at the end of this article.
2-3.
230. Id.
10-11. Compare Operating Rules, supra note 220, 24 with Operating Rules of the Judicial Nomi231. Id.
nating Committee, 8(c) (adopted under authority of Miss. Exec. Order No. 587) (April 30, 1988) (on file with
author). The rules promulgated pursuant to Executive Order No. 587 are also included in the appendices following the article.
232. Exec. Order No. 587, supra note 229, 2(c).
233. Id. 4(b).
234. Id. 4(e); Exec. Order, supra note 208, 16.
235. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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supreme court by Governor Winter in 1983, former Justice Robertson received
23 6
one of the highest ratings ever given by the Judicial Nominating Committee.
The committee's collective professional judgment regarding Justice Robertson's
qualifications, however, was obviously of little assistance in the heat of a highly
partisan election campaign.
VI. CoNcLusIoN: A SUGGESTION FOR CHANGE
Although the design of judicial selection systems often reflects the struggle to
balance majoritarian rule with the need for judicial independence, Mississippi has
made no attempt to compromise between these principles. Instead, by providing
for its judges to be selected and retained by partisan election, Mississippi emphasizes public accountability to the exclusion of judicial independence. The judiciary's role as a check on legislative and executive power, and as protector of
individual rights and liberties, however, requires some measure of insulation from
self-indulgent partisan interests and transient popular politics: This needed protection is not provided through election of judges. Indeed, the Jacksonian "experiment" of elective judiciaries is widely perceived as a failure that has simply served
23 7
to undermine judicial independence.
Unless the importance of an independent judicial branch is recognized, Mississippi can expect further politicization of its judiciary. It cannot continue to require
judges to compete for popular support in the arena of public opinion, as do executives, legislators, and other politicians, and avoid devastating consequences to judicial decision-making. It would be sad irony if Mississippi's reinforcement of
democratic ideals through judicial elections created a judiciary in which the need
to win reelection overrides impartial application of the rule-of-law, and where distortive and manipulative electioneering for judicial office is casually accepted.
It is submitted, therefore, that Mississippi, a state often slow to accept change,
needs to abandon its antiquated method of selecting judges by partisan election, as
a majority of states have already done.2 38 This does not necessarily require, however, adoption of a system emphasizing judicial independence to the exclusion of
public accountability. One need look only to the federal model of executive appointment, senate confirmation, and life tenure, to realize that partisan influences
are not eliminated simply because a selection system places a high premium on independence. Such a system merely substitutes other, perhaps equally dangerous,
political forces. The evolution of commission selection, however, has demon-

236. Re-elect Robertson, supra note 105, at 2.
237. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1990).

If not from God or nature, where could the common law have come from but from the judges themselves?
That would make them legislators-unelected ones, to boot. Many of our states confronted this possibility head on, by making their judiciaries elective. But this experiment merely undermined judicial independence and encouraged the perception (at times self-perception) of judges as nothing more than
Despite its persistence, the concept of an electivejudiciary is generaly and corlegislators in robes ....
rectly regardedas afailure.
Id. (emphasis added).
238. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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strated the greatest ability to reinforce both independence and accountability,
while simultaneously striving to eliminate, to the extent possible, the dangerous
effects of partisan politics.
Although termed an "awkward compromise, "23 commission selection offers
Mississippi its best opportunity to tailor a system emphasizing professional qualifications, competence, and integrity, and de-emphasizing politics. The work begun by the administration of Governor Winter, and continued during the tenure of
Governor Mabus, provides a commendable foundation for such an effort. Converting the Judicial Nominating Committee to a permanent selection tool would
require significant alterations, however, including provisions lessening, or eliminating, the governor's control over the appointment of its membership. Strict provisions against lobbying efforts, including by the executive, directed toward
members are also necessary to allow the committee to function independently.
Furthermore, to allow Mississippi citizens to play an informed and effective role,
any retention election component must be accompanied by a strong presence by
the state bar in providing voters with meaningful information. Although no selection mechanism is a complete panacea, a carefully established and monitored system of commission selection will go a long way toward freeing Mississippi's judges
from the stranglehold of partisan politics, while providing for a highly qualified
and independent judiciary.

239. Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction:JudicialSelection andthe Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1555, 1561 (1988).
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Appendices
APPENDIX "A"

Executive OrderNo. 587

The maintenance of a strong and viablejudiciary is essential to the protection of
the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the State of Mississippi.
Under the constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi, the Governor is authorized to fill by appointment certain vacancies in judicial office.
It is my firm belief that only the most qualified, conscientious, and dedicated
persons available should be appointed to serve the public as judicial officers.
As a result, I, Ray Mabus, Governor of the State of Mississippi, under and by
virtue of the constitution and laws of this state, do hereby promulgate the following Executive Order effective immediately. All previous Executive Orders previously issued pertaining to the Judicial Nominating Committee or the subject
matter of this Executive Order are superseded and rescinded.
1. There is created and established by this Executive Order an advisory council
to be known as the Judicial Nominating Committee. It shall be the responsibility of the Judicial Nominating Committee to consider all applications for
nominations and to nominate, in accordance with this Executive Order, persons qualified and eligible to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court, in the respective Chancery and Circuit Courts and the respective County Courts of
the State of Mississippi.
2. The Judicial Nominating Committee shall consist of 18 members to be appointed as follows:
a. The Governor shall appoint three members from each Supreme Court
district who shall be citizens of the State of Mississippi and may be, but
need not be, practicing attorneys at law. These members shall be known
as "Governor's committee members".
b. The Governor shall appoint three additional members from each district
from a list of persons recommended for appointment by the President of
the Mississippi State Bar, who shall be members of the Mississippi State
Bar who are practicing attorneys at law. These members shall be known
as "Bar committee members".
c. In making appointments or nominations, the Governor and the President
of the Mississippi State Bar shall endeavor to create and to maintain a
nominating commission whose membership is not limited to a particular
race, sex, or interest group.
3. The Governor shall appoint one member of the Judicial Nominating Committee to serve as its chairman. The appointment of the chairman shall be for
a period of one year, and may be renewed.

1. Miss. Exec. Order No. 587 (Gov. Ray Mabus, March 18, 1988) (on file with author).
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4. Governor's committee members shall serve terms fixed in advance by the
Governor which terms shall not exceed the appointing governor's term of office.
5. Bar committee members shall initially be appointed for staggered terms for
one, two, or three years. Upon expiration of the term of any Bar member,
the Governor shall appoint a successor Bar committee member for a term of
three years.
6. When a vacancy occurs on the committee due to the resignation, disability,
or death of a member, a successor shall be chosen by the Governor for the
unexpired term in the same manner as was used to choose the member to be
replaced.
7. No member of the Judicial Nominating Committee shall be eligible for appointment to judicial office or reappointment to the nominating committee
until after the expiration of one year from the date of the member's resignation or completion of the member's term.
8. The Governor shall designate an ex-officio Secretary, to serve at the Governor's will and pleasure, who shall be responsible for maintaining the records
of the nominating committee.
9. The six members appointed from each Supreme Court District shall constitute a subcommittee, each bearing the number of the Supreme Court District
they serve. The chairman of the Judicial Nominating Committee shall serve
as ex-officio chairman of each subcommittee, or may appoint a member of
that subcommittee to serve as its chairman.
10. Wherever a vacancy occurs in a Circuit, Chancery, or County judicial office, upon the call of the Governor, the subcommittee whose jurisdiction
embraces the judicial district of the office shall meet to consider the qualifications and eligibility of all proposed nominees for appointment. The subcommittee shall seek, receive, and review applications and other
information concerning the qualifications and eligibility of nominees. The
subcommittee shall notify the Bar Associations and other such organizations, as the subcommittee shall deem appropriate, of the existence of such
vacancy and of the nomination procedure to be followed by the subcommit.tee, and shall request nominations. The subcommittee may seek and receive
recommendations from other interested citizens and groups.
11. By not later than 30 days after the call by the Governor, the subcommittee
shall meet, evaluate, select, certify as qualified, and recommend for gubernatorial appointment three nominees for each vacancy in each judicial office. However, where the judicial district from which the vacancy may be
filled has less than 40 attorneys who actively practice in law, as shown by the
most recent records of the Mississippi State Bar, the subcommittee may recommend for appointment less than three persons for each vacancy.
12. Anything contained in the foregoing paragraphs to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever there is a vacancy in the Supreme Court of the State of
Mississippi, the entire Judicial Nominating Committee shall seek, receive,
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and review applications as outlined above and shall meet to consider such
vacancy and upon consideration of the applicants, shall select five nominees
for such vacancy in the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.
13. No nominee shall be certified as qualified by a nominating subcommittee or
the Nominating Committee as a whole unless the committee or subcommittee finds affirmative evidence that the nominee meets the following qualifications:
a. That the nominee possesses all of the qualifications provided by law for
the judicial office involved.
b. That the nominee possesses the personal qualities and attributes of character and professional competence, high ethical standards, and other personal characteristics necessary to qualify a person to serve the public in
the judicial office to which the nomination is made.
14. If any nominee shall be rejected by the Governor or shall notify the Governor of their unwillingness or inability to accept appointment, the Governor
may request the Nominating Committee or subcommittee to submit additional nominees.
15. With the approval of the Governor, the Committee shall adopt such operating rules, forms, and notices as it may from time to time deem necessary.
16. All applications and information received from or concerning nominees and
all proceedings of the Nominating Committee shall be held strictly confidential.
17. Nothing in this order is intended to in any way impair or delegate the constitutional and statutory duties or prerogatories of the Governor in the filling of
vacancies of judicial office by appointment. The right to reject any or all of
the nominees so selected and recommended is reserved unto the Governor.
(Original signed by Governor Ray Mabus on March 18, 1988)
APPENDIX

"B"

OperatingRules of the JudicialNominating Committee2
The following operating rules are hereby adopted by the Mississippi Judicial
Nominating Committee in accordance with the authority of paragraph 15 of Executive Order No. 587 issued by Ray Mabus, Governor of the State of Mississippi,
on March 18, 1988.
The word "committee" when used in these rules refers to the Judicial Nominating Committee if the vacancy being filled is on the Supreme Court and to the appropriate subcommittee of the Judicial Nominating Committee if the vacancy
being filled is on a Circuit, Chancery, or County Court.

2. Operating Rules of the Judicial Nominating Committee (adopted under the authority of Miss. Exec. Order No. 587) (April 30, 1988) (on file with author).
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1. CHAIRMAN
The chairman of the committee shall preside at any meeting of the committee
at which the chairman is present. In the chairman's absence the chairman shall
choose another member to act as chairman.
2. SECRETARY
The secretary of the committee shall maintain the records of the committee. In
the secretary's absence the chairman shall choose a person to act as secretary.
3. MEETINGS
Meetings of the committee may be called by the chairman by written notice to
the other members specifying the time and place of the meeting. Meetings will
normally be held in the Governor's Mansion. The chairman shall take such steps
as are necessary to advise new members about the rules and procedures of the
committee. A quorum of the Judicial Nominating Committee shall be twelve
members.
4. MEMBERS
(a) Members of the committee shall consider each candidate for a judicial office in an impartial, objective manner.
(b) If a member knows of any personal or business relationship that the member or another member has with a candidate that may influence or appear to influence the decision of the member as to the candidate, such as a relationship by
blood, by marriage, or through a law or business partnership, the member shall
report that fact to the chairman. Such report shall be included in the record of the
committee. If a substantial conflict of interest exists due to such personal or business relationship, the member should disqualify himself/herself from voting on
that candidate.
(c) A member shall not attempt to influence the decision of another member by
presenting that member with facts and opinions not relevant to the judicial qualifications of the candidates. A member shall not allow any person or organization to
influence the member with any matters other than those that are relevant to the
judicial qualifications of the candidates. Matters relevant to the judicial qualifications of the candidates shall include, but not be limited to, a candidate's character,
experience, temperament, competence, ethical standards, health, impartiality, industry, integrity, professional skills, and the ability to abstain from politics in the
performance of judicial duties. With respect to trial judges, decisiveness and
speaking ability shall also be examined. When the vacancy is on the Supreme
Court, members shall especially take into account collegiality and writing ability.
(d) All communications between members, between a member and a candidate, or between a member and any other person or organization with respect to
the judicial qualifications of a candidate shall be kept confidential and discussed
only among the members. At the conclusion of deliberations, all documents shall
be returned to the secretary.
(e) Members should always keep in mind that frequently persons of the highest
qualifications will not actively seek judicial appointment. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the members to seek out well qualified persons and to encourage them to•
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agree to accept nomination, even if a member may ultimately be unable to vote for
that person's nomination.
5. SUBCOMMITTEES
(a) The six members appointed from each Supreme Court District shall constitute a subcommittee, each such subcommittee bearing the designation of the Supreme Court District. The chairman of the Judicial Nominating Committee shall
serve as chairman of each subcommittee or alternatively may appoint a member of
that subcommittee to serve as chairman. The chairman of the Judicial Nominating
Committee shall be a voting member of each subcommittee. A quorum of a subcommittee shall be four members.
6. VOTING
The committee may act by majority vote of members present except for elimination from further consideration of candidates and in the ultimate selection of
nominees.
7. CANDIDATES
(a) When a vacancy occurs, on the call of the Governor, the chairman shall
cause notice of the vacancy to be given by mail to the newspapers in the county in
which the vacancy exists, to the state and local bar associations, and to the court
clerks requesting that the notice be posted in a public place in the office of the
clerk. A questionnaire seeking background information shall be submitted to each
candidate for completion and return to the secretary of the committee.
(b) After the questionnaires have been returned to the secretary, the chairman
shall assign to members and the secretary responsibilities for compiling background information. Other members, whether or not assigned, may also compile
background information. Background information is to be compiled by contacting
individuals and institutions mentioned in the questionnaire. In addition, individuals and groups from the candidate's community may be contacted in an effort to
obtain as much information as possible.
8. SELECTION OF NOMINEES
(a) After all relevant background information has been compiled, each candidate is to be interviewed by the committee. The interview may be preceded by a
brief discussion of a candidate's qualifications.
(b) After the interviews have been completed, the chairman shall read the
names of the candidates in alphabetical order and members shall report on the
results of their investigation of that candidate. Thereafter, the chairman shall open
the meeting to a discussion of that particular candidate's qualifications for judicial
office. After this procedure has been followed for each candidate, the chairman
shall open the meeting to a general discussion of the relative qualifications of all
the candidates.
(c) Upon completion of the discussion of the candidates qualifications, the
committee shall vote. Voting shall be conducted by secret ballot. Each member
shall vote for (same as number to be nominated; these rules will hereafter assume
this number to be three) candidates and shall list these candidates in order of preference. Upon completion of the balloting, the secretary shall tabulate the votes by
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assigning three points to each candidate listed in the first position on each ballot,
two points to each candidate listed in second position of each ballot, and one point
to each candidate listed in third position on each ballot. The three candidates (five
if the vacancy being filled is on the Supreme Court) receiving the most points shall
be certified for nomination by the committee. If this procedure proves to be indecisive by reason of a tie vote, additional ballots shall be cast until the tie is broken.
On ballots subsequent to the first ballot, members shall vote for only so many candidates as there remain nominees to be selected.
(d) If there are more than five candidates (eight if the vacancy being filled is on
the Supreme Court) there will be an initial vote using the voting procedures described above to determine the top five (eight) candidates. Then another vote shall
be taken to determine the nominees.
9. TRANSMITTAL TO THE GOVERNOR
(a) The names of the nominees, listed in alphabetical order, shall be hand-delivered to Governor Mabus.
(b) No other information shall be forwarded to Governor Mabus except that the
committee, any of its members or the secretary may consult with the Governor at
his request, and the committee may furnish the Governor, at his request, copies of
the nominees' questionnaires and other information gathered during the investigations.

